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I, INTRODUCTION
Laws in many countries and Caiifornia require that artists receive resale royalties from their works (called droit de suite, "the right to art proceeds." in the legal literature).' Severai times in the last few years, Congress debated such a guarantee; but, due to substantial opposition by some artists and others. Congress has not passed such a bilL2 The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (Item 74, 5608). however, required that a study be conducted by the Register of Copyrights in consultation with the Chair of the National Endowment for the Arts, on the feasibility of imp~ementin~:~ (A) a requirement that. after the first sale of a work of art, a royalty on any resale of the work. consisting of a percentage of the price. be paid to the author of the work: and (B) other possible requirements that would achieve the objective of allowing an author of a work of art to share monetarily in the enhanced value of that work.
We believe that there are two key questions such a study should answer. First, would artists or others benefit from artists receiving resole royalties? Second, should the government mandate such rights?
The answer to the second question appears simpler than the first. Suppose such a right i s desirabie, Why should royalties be required by law? After all. in the absence of such o law, artist and purchasers can sign a iegally binding contract establishing a right to resale royaities. Indeed, some artists write complex contracts that reserve this and other future rights One can imagine two justificatons for mandating this right. First, it might be argued that some young artists are too naive to ask for or write such legally binding contracts so that it is better for these rights be inherent and require that the artist must affirmativeiy waive these rights if so desired. We discuss this issue at greater length below.
A second, and more compelling, argument i s that the government can lower costs of writing and enforcing such agreements between artists and purchasers.4
Writing and enforcing private contracts may be very expensive or difficult. How, for example, can artists know when their works are resold and the resale price? How wouid the originai purchaser know where the artist currently lives to send the royalties? it i s possible that the government can lower the transaction costs of writing and enforcing contracts. Under the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, the Register of Copyrights i s already required to establish a registry of artist^.^ The government could also require that the saie of ail art work over a certain value be reported to the registry. At a higher cost to the government, the artists' royaities could be sent to the registry to be forwarded to the artists.
Such a system might be cumbersome and expensive, so to estabiish whether it i s desirable would require a carefui cost-benefit analysis. If resale royaities are only an issue for a handful of extremely successfui artists (as de Kooning. Motherwell, and other artists argued before Congress), such a compiex system wouid not make sense and private contracts wouid be more sensible. On the other hand, if many artists' works would be invoived, it is conceivable that the government can, through scaie economies, reduce transaction costs. A private registry wouid achieve the same scaie economies, but it wouid iack the enforcement threat of the federal government.
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For the remainder of this paper, we turn to the first question: who would benefit or lose from a government mandate that artists receive resaie royalties? Because there i s no simple, clear-cut answer to this question, we discuss the implications of such a requirement under a number of scenarios.
We start by describing a simple model of how art work i s sold through dealers and the effects of a resaie royalties requirement. We use that model to demonstrate why an artist might prefer a resale royalties requirement (especially one determined by contract). Then, in the next two sections, we discuss additional advantages and disadvantages of such a requirement. Finaiiy, we discuss, in more detail, which groups stand to gain or lose.
ARTI STS AND DEALERS
Art is sold through dealers, at auction, and in a variety of other ways. Because of the relative importance for the works of young artists, we concentrate on sales through deaiers. We first describe the relationship between artists and dealers and then build a simple model to iliustrate that the artist may prefer a resaie royalty
The Relationship Between Artisfs and Dealers Art markets are thin. it i s costly for a coilector to see the works of many artists.
The costs would be prohibitive for many coliectors if they had to identify artists and visit them individually at their studios located throughout the worid. Dealers reduce coilectors' information costs by exhibiting their work in gaiieries and broaden the scope of market by providing promotional effort. That is, dealers do much of the leg work for collectors by identifying the works of skilied artists working in certain media or 4 taking certain approaches, bringing these works to a central location, and then informing collectors where they are. In exchange for exhibiting and promoting their works. artists often give a particular dealer the exciusive rights to show their works.'
The deaier promotes the work and the artist by maintaining a gallery (showroom) staffed by knowledgeabie sales peopie, advertising, holding receptions for collectors to meet the artist, and in other ways.
Most young artists have little capital and cannot borrow against their highly speculative future earnings due to imperfect capital market^.^ As a result. these young artists do not have the funds to promote their own work and must rely on the promotional activities of the dealers. Moreover, to the degree that dealers exhibit the works of several artists, economies of scale are achieved so that dealers' marginal promotional costs are lower than those of artists.
Dealers and artists contract in a variety of ways. Under one type of agreement, the dealer buys the work from the artist for a fixed amount and then resells it, keeping any profit. A more common agreement i s for the dealer to handle the work on commission, so that the deaier and the artist spiit the sales price. Even under such an agreement, a deaier who finds a toienled artist and who plans to promote effectively that artist's work may choose to buy and hold some of the artist's works to speculate that the price for these works wiil rise in the future, Artists and dealers have two objectives: they wont high expected earnings and low risk. Unfortunately, seiling art i s a very risky business. At ieast partially for this reason, many risk-averse dealers prefer the commission approach where both the artist and the deaier share the risk of not seiiing the work or seiiing it at only a relatively low price.
If the deaier i s not risk averse (or at least less risk averse than the artist), the alternative agreement, where the artist selis the work to the dealer, increases total revenues. The dealer bears aii the risk but gains ail the benefits from a higher saies price to a collector. Thus, the deaier has the incentive to optimaiiy promote the work.9
In contrast. under a commission agreement, the deaier bears all the costs of promoting (because sharing these costs with young artists i s infeasibie) but receives only a fraction of the returns. As a result, the deaier engages in less than the optimal level of promotion, as i s shown in the foiiowing model.
A resaie royalties requirement affects the initiai saies price of works of arts and reduces the promotional activities of deaiers. To the degree that coilectors speculate that these works can be resoid later at a higher price, these initiai buyers wouid not be willing to pay as high an initiai price for the works if there is a resale royaities requirement and some pure specuiators may not purchase at all. Similarly, if dealers are the initial purchasers, they wouid not be willing to spend as much promoting the art as in the absence of such a requirement, which further reduces the demand.
Thus, the initiai price of a work by a young artist probabiy foiis.
A Simple Model
The following model i s used to show that an artist may prefer a lower initial price and a share of the resaie revenues to a higher initioi price and no resaie revenues, For now, we assume that there is no risk, that the artist can contract costiessly for royalties from resaie, and that co!!ectors buy and keep the works indefinitely.
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An artist wants to maximize her earnings. She would incur prohibitively high transaction costs if she tried to sell the work herself directiy to collectors. Instead, she sells her work to a dealer, who has lower transaction costs, and who wiil promote and resell the work. There is a downward sloping demand curve for this artist's work. There are many dealers competing for her work so that dealers have no monopsony power.
Dealer-Owned Gallery
The artist seils q pieces of her art works to the dealer at price w. She also receives a share, a, possibly zero. of the resale price. p.''
The dealer maximizes his profit, If the artist i s a utility maximizer, she sets w and a to maximize her utility, which i s a function of her earnings and the pleosure or displeasure she receives from working.
For simpliciiy, we assume the artist i s an earnings maximizer:
where c is her foregone earnings (or psychic costs or benefits) of producing a work of art.
If the artist sets w and a and then the deaier picks p and s. the resulting equilibrium i s not a first best for the artist because the dealer marks up the painting (p > w), which reduces sales (holding s constant). Were the artist not to allow the dealer a second markup, however, from Equation (3), the deaier wouid provide no services.
Thus, the artist purposefuiiy shares her market power with the dealer to insure he promotes her and her work."
The artist's optimai a i s not typicoily zero. The artist i s generally better off if she has two instruments, w and a, rather than one, because she wants to affect both the dealer's price and his promotional activities.
Arfisf-Owned Gaiiery
If the artist owned the goliery, as o few artists do, then she couid maximize her earnings,12 There would be no need to set ?n/ or a because the only sale would be to collectors (that is, formaily, the sale io a COi!e~tor i s no longer a resale). The artist would set p and s to maximize total profit of n = (p -c)q(p, s) -s. Promotionai activity 8 and total profit are higher than if the decision making i s decentralized (where n = n, + nd).
T o make this example simpler still, we now assume that the demand curve i s multiplicatively separable: q(p, s) = f(p)g(s). One implication of this assumption is that the price i s independent of promotional activity and promotional activity only affects the number of units sold. T o show this result, we substitute for q(p, s) in Equations (2) and (3) and divide (2) through by g(s):
With this demand function, if the artist raises w or a, the dealer raises the price and reduces his promotional activities:
As a result, the quantity said unambiguously fails Capital Gains So far, we have assumed that the resale royalty i s collected on the resale price.
Instead, the royalty rate couid be applied to only the capital With separable demand, the dealer's profit is:
where p i s the royalty rate on capital gains and w i s the payment per painting that the artist receives from the dealer (w plays the same role as w in the model above).
Assuming an interior solution, the dealer's first-order conditions are Whether the royalty i s assessed on the resaie price (a) or on the capital gains (P), affects the royalty rate and the payment per piece of art (w or w). The other variables (p. s, q, and profit) are the same under both systems.
For this specific example, the optimal p is 5 t w/2 for a royally on capital gains:
whereas the optimal royaity i s 5 + w/(2(1 -a)) for a royaity on the resale price. That is, price is independent of p in the capitai gains modei, but price i s not independent of a in the other model.
Thus. with the resale royalty on price, an increase in the rate, a, increases the price and decreases quantity, all eise equai. Given that g(s) i s concave (as it must be far the second-order condition for profit-maximization to hold), equiiibrium promotional activity is greater for a given royaity rate when the royaity i s on capital gains because the dealer keeps more of the marginai gain to promotion.
Where c = 0 (no cost of production), under either system, the artist prefers to reiy on the resaie royaities fa or p) aione and sets her initial price (w or w) to zero, Thi s result i s not surprising, because w = 0 and a resaie i s assumed, so that the profit i s the same regardless of whether capital gains or the resaie price i s used.
Although the assumption of no opportunity cost i s unreaiistic, it i s clear that in general the artist would not set cc or (3 equoi to zero.15 indeed, these simuiations suggest that the artist may want to set the lump-sum payment to zero or a smaii value and to reiy on the royalty for most of her earnings. That paitern i s ciose to what is commonly observed (though, perhaps, for other reasons): the artist receives small (perhaps studio space) or no payments, and the deoier and the artist split the revenues from the saie to collectors. 
Profecting the Artist
If there are oniy a few deaiers who can potentiaiiy exhibit a particular artist's works, the artist may be at a disadvantage in negotiating with those dealers. That is.
that dealers can "take advantage of" young artists by paying them relatively little for their works. in economics jargon, such dealers have asymmetric bargaining power or monopsony power, Given sufficient monopsony power. under the current system, the deaier pays artists the reservation value for their works (the minimum amount an artist will accept).
If the deaier i s forced to guarantee royalties from resaie, the deaier will want to reduce the initiai price paid for the works. However, given the dealer i s aiready paying the bare minimum the artist will accept (and there are imperfect capital markets that prevent artists from borrowing), the deaier cannot further lower the initial price. Under these circumstances, mandating the rights to resale royalties benefits young artists by overcoming the asymmetric bargaining power they face. Of course.
the requirement wiil oniy benefit artists if they cannot be forced to waive these rights by a powerful dealer. Moreover, to the degree that galleries are driven out of the market by reduced earnings, the law may exacerbate problems due to the thin market.
We presume that many sponsors of such legislation have this scenario in mind.
They feel that the government needs to be paternaiistic to young artists. We wonder.
however, how reaiistic it is, It seems likeiy that the competition by gaiieries for young artists i s strong enough that deaiers have little, if any, monopsony power. We believe the next two arguments probably hove moie merit,
DurabiWy Erects
Estabiished artists may be motivated to work harder later in their careers by a resaie royaity requirement. Older artists who improve their reputations increase both the price of their current works and the royaities from the resaie of their earlier works.
With a resaie royalties requirement, artists benefit more fiom an increased reputation.
That is, the externalities from reputation are partially internalized if the artist shares in the resale revenues. The larger an artist's share of the resale price, the greater the incentive the artist has to put effort into producing more or better quality works or engaging in other activities that increase tile artist's reputation, 16 
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An analogous argument i s made in the Coase ~onjecture." Coase argued that current and future production by a durable goods monopolist are substitutes that compete with each other if resales are po~sible,'~ AS a result. the monopolist can obtain higher current prices (and present discounted earnings) if it can convince potential purchasers that it wiil not produce close substitutes in the future. That is, it would not be surprising if the price of paintings of a famous artist. such as Picasso.
increased upon his or her death.
The analogy of the standard durable goods analysis to the art market i s imperfect, however, because an artist's later works are not a perfect substitute for earlier works and because later works may increase the vaiue of earlier works (by enhancing the artist's reputation). Later work may affect the artist's reputation either through increased quantity or increased quality. For example, by producing a few.
very-high quality paintings in iater years, prices of both new and old art works may increase.
A resale royaity introduces 'friction" into the second-hand market, reducing the number of resales. Earlier works are l ess iikeiy to compete with later works, hence the artist has iess of an incentive to restrict production, Thus, a resaie tax or royaity has an effect analogous to a decrease in durability in reducing the durability externality problem.
Alternative Pricing Practices
A resale royoities requirement may lead to pricing practices that increase artists' earnings, much in the manper of agricultural marketing orders, which allow farmers to price discriminate to increase profit. Suppose, for example, that on artist could earn more by charging a high price in New Yo: k City and a low price in Kansas
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City for a given work (e. g., numbered iithographs). Currently. there i s nothing to prevent someone from buying at the low price in Kansas City and undercutting the artist in New York City. To the degree that an artist i s important enough to make such arbitrage worthwhile, the atiist i s prevented from price discriminating. which decreases revenues. Similarly, artists have a limited incentive to store their own works in order to price discriminate over time (selling a given lithograph at a low price when the artist i s young and at a higher price iater)."
A resale royalties requirement facilitates price discrimination over time or space because it reduces the incentive to resell works, An arbitrager (speculator), who in the absence of a requirement keeps all the returns from a resaie, must share some of the revenues with the artist. As a result, under a resaie royalty requirement, initial purchasers are less likely to reseli in the future. Thus, a larger fraction of buyers consists of collectors who wiil keep the works indefiniteiy (and a smaller fraction consists of speculators).
That is. in some sense, this requirement works for the wrong reason, The artist may earn relatively iittle in the way of resaie royaities because few works are resold, Nonetheless, the atiist gains by being able to charge more for paintings later in life.
Because collectors do not reseil earlier works, the artist's later works face less competition for current doiiars from the artist's earlier works.
IV. THE DRAWBACKS OF RESALE ROYALTY REQUIREMENTS
Artists and others might not wont a resaie royaities requirement for at least three reasons. First, such a requirement shifts risks toward artists. Second, and probably more important, it may have adverse effects on promotional activities by dealers, which wili harm young artists, Third, it may dissuade some potential artists from entering this iine of work. If artists can easily waive the rights to future royalties.
however, they need not suffer these harms even if a law creates rights to resale royalties.
Risk Bearing
The maximum price the initial purchaser would be willing to pay is lower if, because of a contract or government requirement, he must pay the artist a royalty from a resale. That is, the initial price i s lowered to reflect the reduced potential capital gains. Because there i s uncertainly about the future value of any work of art, bath the artist and the initial purchaser share that ri sk under a resaie royaity requirement.
Where the artist does not share in future proceeds, the initial purchaser bears all the risks.
it is reasonable to assume that wealthier individuals and those who are better able to diversify risks are the ones who are most willing to bear risk." Typically.
young artists are less wealthy and less able to diversify than are purchasers, After all, collectors, specuiators, and dealers may purchase the works of many young artists and wili see their holdings increase in wealth if only some of these works eventually become very valuable. In contrast, each artist's future royalties depend on the future value of only his or her own works.
Thus, if an artist were given the choice between receiving more initialiy or receiving less Initicily but with the potentiality of more later, the artist might, quite rationaily and reasonably, opt for the former choice. That is, being ill-suited to bear risks, the artist may want a certain retcrn now, wen if it has a iower expected value than the alternative, Because the gaiiery now bears ail the costs of promotion and receives only a fraction of the returns, it engages in iess promotion.
In our model, the artist faces a tradeoff from a higher royalty rate: the reduced promotional effort by the dealer may offset the increased royaity earnings, There i s an optimal royally rate that i s probably nonzero. An artist that can set the royalty rate i s able to maximize her earnings. If the government sets the royalty rate and there are high costs to renegotiating that rate, the rate probably will not be set optimally for most artists. If it is set too high, too little promotion will take piace.
Consider now a different model of how the artist and the dealer interact.
Instead of the artist setting a price and a royally rate, the artist and the dealer could piay a cooperative (e. g., Nosh) game where the artist seils the works to the dealer who then promotes them (at lower cost than ihe artist can) and reseiis them. The artist and the dealer bargain over how much the artist receives, which depends on the expected resale price. Suppose ihe price the coiiectors pay depends on promotion, but, otherwise, they wili buy as muck as the artist can produce at that price, Given the artist's inherent ability, the surpius the artist and the dealer share depends on the dealer's efforts. if the dealer gets all of the marginai revenues (the artist receives a iump sum payment rather than a fraction of the resaie price), the dealer engages in the efficient ievei of promotionai effort. The law, if it changes this splitting rule, may lead to inefficient production of effort. That is, if the aiiist receives a share of the resaie price, the deaier oniy receives (1 -a) of the revenues but incurs ail the promotionai costs. Hence, as a rises, the gallery reduces its promotional efforts. If, however, only a fixed level of promotional efforts i s necessary (fixed possibility frontier), the law can change the bargaining soiution, thereby helping the artist and hurting the deaier.
So far in our discussion, we have concentrated on resales by galleries, if, however. collectors or museums also promote artists and their works, the same type of reasoning wouid appiy. That is, a resale royalty requirement wouid reduce their promotionai activities as well.
Learning by Doing and Occupafionai Choice
The resale royalty requirement also may reduce the quantity and quaiity of art for a reason related to the risk-bearing argument. Artists typically have difficuity borrowing against highly speculative future returns. If the imposition of a resaie royalty requirement leads artists to receive smalier initial payments than under the current system, they may find that they cannot live on those sums in the short run.
As a result, they may switch to another occupation on a fuil-or part-time 21 - basis. lo the degree that there i s learning by doing in art as in other activities (one's skill increases with experience, at least for a while), both the quantity and 18 quality of art work by young artists may diminish. Thi s argument is somewhat offset b y the corresponding one above that older artists have an incentive to work harder.
V. GAINERS AND LOSERS
There are five groups who stand to gain or lose from a government-mandated resale royalties requirement: artists, dealers, collectors, specuiators. and taxpayers.
Some individuals, notably dealers, may belong to several of these groups. Taxpayers only care to the extent that they must pay for enforcing such ruies. To the extent that the other groups bear these expenses (through establishing a private system or reimbursing the government), taxpayers should be indifferent. The other groups, however, may be affected substantially if resaie royalties are made mandatory, Again, if artists can waive these rights, this system may differ little from the current one.
A resale royalty requirement reduces collectors' incentives to resell works of art, which they can keep and appreciate viewing.22 in contrast. a pure speculator who i s only Interested in capital gains will continue to seli any work because the speculator puts no value on keeping the work for its own sake. As a result, if such a requirement goes into effect, a larger share of art wiii be owned by collectors who intend to keep the works.
Initial sales prices for works by artists wi!! be lowered for three reasons. fewer of their early works wiil be resold. which allows them to charge more for iater works (price discriminate over time or space); and they may face competition from fewer other artists (because many dropped out at a young age).
Because the demand for works from young artists decreases, some deaiers who specialize in such artists may go out of business and others wiii reduce their promotional activities. initial saies prices wiil fall so that the gallery's share of these prices will diminish. Deaiers who specialize in the works of well-estabiished artists wiii be iess affected and may even benefit as the vaiue of their works increase,
Vi, CONCLUSIONS
Our main conciusion is that a law in which the government guarantees artists the rights to resaie royaities may have iittie effect if artists can waive these rights.
Young artists can currentiy contract with ourchasers to ensure resaie royaities; yet, very few do so. That they do not may reflect that either they believe such compensation scheme i s not desirable or that the tronsaciion and enforcement costs are prohibitive- Given that the government is already obligated to maintain a registry of artists, perhaps the best solution i s for the government to help iower the transaction and enforcement costs of contracts that set resale royalty rates. For the government to actually set the rate, or even worse. to mandate a particular rate would almost certainly be harmful for many young artists. 12. The artist couid aiso achieve the first-best outcome in two other ways. First, if the artist could observe the dealer's promotional expenditures, she could extract all but E profits by setting the royaity on profits and obtain the first-best equiiibrium. It is extremely unlikeiy, however, that on artist could observe profits. Second, if the artist had additional instruments of controi over the deaier (e. g.. the artist could controi the resaie price). the artist couid achieve her first best. These additional types of controls have been discussed at iength in the franchise iiterature: however, they are very uniikely here. We doubt that many (if any) dealer-artist agreements aiiow the artist to determine the resaie price. One reason is that, in the real world, demand i s random.
It would be costiy to write con'iingeni contracis specifying the resaie price under
